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Summary
This study shows that since the Keynes-White dispute in the middle of the 20th centu-
ry, the global economic policy thinking is clearly determined by White’s views up until 
today. In the global monetary system, debt restructuring solutions are subordinated to 
the global economic order, and not to national economy policies, as shown by the re-
cent examples of Greece, Hungary and Ukraine. According to this thinking, basically 
the debtor is held liable for imbalance and over-indebtedness. Obviously, the system 
cannot solve balance of payments problems between countries and the ensuing debt 
crises. The free movement of goods and capital is given an absolute priority. We show 
that out of the elements of the Keynesian system, only the introduction of creditor’s 
liability as an instrument and the establishment of some sort of a supranational debt 
restructuring forum were proposed as a comprehensive solution after the 2008 crisis, 
besides some small-scale technical suggestions (e.g. the CAC). The reform propos-
als have not brought about any significant change in the management of sovereign 
defaults. In the euro area, after the 2010 sovereign crisis, the emphasis was laid on 
establishing the institutional background for the short-term financing of countries in 
debt crisis, rather than on genuine institutional reform of debt restructurings. And 
even in the worst of the crisis, the indebted countries are asked to implement more fis-
cal constraints and privatisation programmes as a prerequisite for further financing. 
András Bethlendi, PhD, Associate Professor, Wekerle Business School, Budapest 
(bethlendi.andras@gmail.com).
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Large international banks and investors and their home countries have no interest 
in institutional reforms: sovereign default remains a slow process with uncertain out-
comes and even enormous costs. In our opinion, the institutional system of sovereign 
debt crisis management can only be reformed by the massive support of already exist-
ing international organisations. It would be a big step forward if IMF/EU abandoned 
their previous practice of protecting private investors and provided better safeguards 
for the interest of indebted countries and/or their own taxpayers. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: E6, F3, G1, H6, K4
Keywords: international organisations, sovereign debt crisis, debt restructuring, cur-
rent account deficit, international financial intermediation, financial markets, inter-
national legal procedures, Greece, Hungary, Ukraine
Introduction
Transparent, cost- and time-efficient corporate bankruptcy laws and practices have 
a long tradition in the developed world. Over the past one or two decades, private 
individuals’ bankruptcies have also been appropriately regulated in certain countries. 
However, sovereign default still remains to be unregulated: a non-transparent process 
with unpredictable political and economic costs and a highly uncertain time course. 
Yet even in the case of conservative and prudent indebtedness, certain events may 
take place that drive a country into a debt crisis. In economic thinking, it is now a rela-
tively wide-spread view that certain rapid and completely unforeseeable events might 
also happen that considerably worsen countries’ debt positions.2 In order to avoid 
long-term economic and political crises, the international community would need a 
bankruptcy mechanism that would help countries to recover quickly.
The subject has recently become topical with the 2010 sovereign debt crisis in the 
euro area. In 2014, financing difficulties in PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece, Spain) except for Greece, in Cyprus and in Hungary seemed to be resolved. 
However, this was when the political-economic crisis started in the Ukraine, on the 
other periphery of Europe. Let we note that, in our opinion, the subject still remains 
to be topical today. As we come to the end of the current financing period which, 
even in economic history terms, proved to be very persistently cheap, a new wave of 
sovereign debt problems can be expected in countries with long-standing current ac-
count deficit.3 
In this paper, we would like to describe the management of sovereign default and 
the assessment of relevant reform proposals in light of an intellectual framework pro-
vided by a dispute that happened more than 70 years ago. This is the negotiation of 
John Maynard Keynes and his “opponent” Harry Dexter White. These two influential 
experts have greatly contributed to establishing the so-called Bretton Woods interna-
tional monetary system. The outcome of their debate was determined mainly by the 
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distribution of power and interests at the time between the United States (White) and 
Great Britain (Keynes), and not by economic aspects. Also, this fact foreshadows one 
of the final conclusions of this paper, namely that debt restructurings are subordi-
nated to the global order (i.e. the distribution of political and economic powers and 
interests), and not to national economy policies. After the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system, no new international monetary system has been created; the current 
system can be seen as a continuation of the Bretton Woods system, as its institutions, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), and the US dol-
lar are still dominating.4 That is the reason why it is important to outline the dispute 
between Keynes and White that serves as a framework for reconsiderations of debt 
restructuring practices and reform measures.
The remaining part of the study is organised as follows. Based on the literature 
after presenting the discussion between Keynes and White, we describe the develop-
ment of the sovereign credit market, the definition of sovereign default and the cur-
rent practice. We introduce a grouping of different reform proposals and evaluate the 
reform proposals and their criticisms. The above is supported by our Greek, Hungar-
ian and Ukrainian case studies. Finally, we conclude. 
Keynes vs.  White;  the conceptual framework
Keynes had looked into the problem of sovereign debt restructuring already in his 
book on the Versailles peace system (Keynes, 2000) that came after World War I. In 
agreement with Szakolczai (2017), all of Keynes’s activities and works clearly point to 
his very last undertaking: creating the Keynesian order of the international monetary 
system. This system is considered as the extension of Keynes’s General Theory onto 
the international platform and, thus, can also be named as Keynes’s International 
General Theory. In Bretton Woods, the view of the United States was elaborated and 
represented by White. His view is considered just as important as it was eventually put 
into practice and has exerted its effects ever since. 
Keynes summarised his pertinent views in two of his works: Post-War Currency Policy 
and Proposals for an International Currency Union (Keynes, 1941a; 1941b). The main ele-
ments of the Keynesian analysis, being, in our opinion, still valid today, are as follows:
– Ever since monetary systems exist, the current account problems between coun-
tries could never be solved, except in one or two shorter periods in time.
– It is a doctrinal illusion based on no experience that any laissez faire, laissez passer 
mechanism (free floating exchange rate, free movement of capital, deflationary process-
es, etc.) can create and maintain balance. It is not supported by any economic policy ex-
perience. Imbalances are persistent and generally lead to current account (debt) crises. 
– The free movement of capital often reinforces imbalance: the financial capital 
flows from countries with persistent deficit (and thus in difficult financial situation) to 
persistently active countries. Speculative capitals are moving rapidly all over the world, 
ruining stable (real) business undertakings. All in all, capital flows in the market exac-
erbate problems caused by imbalance.
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– Surplus countries are just as responsible for imbalances as deficit countries. Sur-
plus countries supplement their insufficient domestic demand by export.
– Back then Keynes had already recognized the essence of what was later named in 
economics the Mundell-Fleming trilemma. A small and open economy cannot simul-
taneously maintain free capital movement, a fixed exchange rate and independent 
macroeconomy (monetary policy) (see Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963). As far as eco-
nomic policy is concerned, this trilemma can be simplified to a dilemma: the priority 
is given either to the national economy conducive to the public good or to the global 
order (Szakolczai, 2017).
– In order to solve the above problems, a supranational institution is needed to 
establish and operate the international monetary system.
From a position of classical economic thinking, White puts the stability of the in-
ternational monetary system first and favours the fixed exchange rate regime. Accord-
ing to his view, basically the debtor is held liable for the imbalance and over-indebt-
edness. At the same time, similarly to Keynes, White acknowledges that certain capital 
flows need to be controlled and fixed exchange rates need to be adjusted, if necessary 
(see Boughton, 2002). The overall aim of his proposal was to gain dominance for the 
United States in the Bretton Woods system, raising a country above others due to its 
economic and political weight. He mocks Keynes’s proposal on a new international 
currency vs. his own “golden dollar” proposal, while his “dollar-standard” proposal 
later failed in practice. He envisaged the IMF to work like a bank and not like a clear-
ing centre, where member countries collect the capital needed for the operation of 
the organisation, and the amount of the capital contribution determines the amount 
of the available loan and the voting rights of a given country.
The above economic policy dilemma is very topical in the euro area, and for mak-
ing considerations about joining to the euro area. The mainstream economic thinking 
in the eurozone is that every country should maintain a completely free movement 
of goods and capital on fixed exchange rates, to the detriment of an autonomous 
economic policy that would help them to develop. So the international order and 
the free movement of capital are given absolute priority. This will be detailed later on 
through the example of how the Greek sovereign crisis was handled. Greece was not 
allowed, among others, to impose temporary restrictions on movement of capital and 
goods as an obvious means of stabilisation, they could only apply fiscal constraints 
and deflation. In light of the above, accession to the euro area is rather in the interest 
of those countries whose economies are in close harmony with the economies of the 
core countries in the euro area. At the same time, it assumes an almost identical level 
of economic development and same economic structures, as giving up the autono-
mous economic policy does not lead to conflict of interests.
Let me note that there are national economies that never surrendered the control 
over the movement of capital and goods. China is a good example for this, proving that 
a long-lasting economic catch-up can also be managed while having significant capital 
constraints at the same time. As for the Mundell-Fleming trilemma, the two elements 
China chose are the independent macroeconomy and the fixed exchange rate.
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Keynes’s proposal
Below you can read a summary of the main elements of Keynes’s proposal for the Bret-
ton Woods system, based on Szakolczai (2017).
1) The system should be established on international level as on the level of a 
country: an international banking system with an International Clearing Union. The 
prerequisite for this is the existence of a supranational currency that would be accept-
ed by all member states’ central banks, and inter-state accounts would be kept in this 
currency. This international money cannot be identical with any national currency, as 
it has a different function: it should be used for international accounting only.
2) The clearing centre does not need capital, as the surplus of surplus countries 
should equal to the deficit of deficit countries.
3) Every country has automatic overdraft facilities, so countries do not have a cred-
itor-debtor relationship with another country, but with the clearing centre.
4) The basic principle of the system is that the surplus countries are just as re-
sponsible for imbalances as deficit countries. So the burden of adjustment should be 
shared by the two parties. It means that not only the deficit countries need restriction 
policies, but also surplus countries need expansion policies (increasing their own do-
mestic demand).
5) Debtor countries should not pay interest to creditors, just a fee of 1–2 percent 
to the clearing centre. At the same time, creditors should not receive interest, but they 
should also pay the 1–2 percent fee to the clearing centre, as they are also responsible 
for the imbalance.
6) In the event a credit does not provide solution, the second proposed action is 
devaluation. The role of the Clearing Union in this is to prevent competitive devalu-
ation.
7) If the latter still proves to be insufficient, then deficit countries have the right to 
impose import restrictions. According to Keynes’s view, the expansion of the freedom 
of international trade can be temporarily reversible, if the situation requires so.
8) The next tool in line is increasing domestic demand in the surplus countries. If 
they do so and still have surplus for an extended period, the surplus should be spent 
on development credits for or investments in developing countries.
9) One of the major elements of the system is the control of international capital 
movement and the restriction of speculative capital flows.
10) Keynes acknowledges at the same time that if the above tools are all inefficient, 
then the given country appears not to have enough economic capacity to maintain 
the same standards of living, so restrictions are also needed.
The above tools are capable of preventing unsustainable imbalances. The most 
important elements of the above proposal (a national currency should not become 
the global currency; automatic and not capital contribution based overdraft facilities; 
the responsibility of creditor countries) were not accepted. At the same time, many 
points of the IMF founding treaty5 reflect the intellectual legacy of Keynes.6 However, 
the subsequent practice of the IMF has gradually moved away from it. 
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Sovereign credit market dynamics in and after the 
Bretton Woods system
In the Bretton Woods system (in the period after World War 2 until 1970) sovereign 
lending was made through intergovernmental or international institutions (World 
Bank, IMF), and it was a strictly controlled process. With the failure of the Bretton 
Woods exchange rate mechanism, from the 1970s, international private banks could 
enter this credit market. As the oil prices increased, oil producing countries made 
significant surplus; part of their savings was channelled by private banking groups to 
developing (oil importing) countries, financing their current account deficits. Long-
lasting imbalances were essentially not corrected by neither economic, nor institu-
tional mechanisms.
The significant debt stocks and risks that were built up in the meantime led to 
the sovereign crisis in 1980-1981. Some comprehensive proposals were made for the 
formal legal framework of sovereign debt restructuring,7 but eventually none of them 
were introduced. Measures for strengthening market processes were taken instead. 
The so-called Baker Plan made a more active lending activity of the IMF and the World 
Bank subject to market reforms, but did not deal with the institutional framework of 
debt restructuring. As the Baker Plan proved to be inefficient, the so-called Brady 
Plan was drawn up that laid the foundation for agreements on credit restructuring 
of developing countries. Besides partial debt relief, banks could exchange their unse-
cured dollar loans for longer-maturity and lower-interest bonds (and thus pulling out 
of financing), in many cases attaching special securities to them (for example, the oil 
reserves in Mexico). By issuing bonds for financing the debt, the secondary trade of 
these bonds were also built up, further increasing the share of market players in sov-
ereign debt financing (Kamenis, 2014). These reforms basically served the creation of 
the sovereign financing market, but were not adequate to provide a comprehensive 
solution to debt crises, and what is more, made the system of sovereign financing 
even more complex and less transparent (for example, with the emergence of related 
credit default swaps and other derivative tools). The inefficiency of this system is aptly 
shown by waves of continuous sovereign crises (1994-1995: the so-called tequila crisis; 
1998: crisis in Asia and in Russia; 2001-2002: crisis in Argentina).
In our opinion, purely market-based risk taking would be an important compo-
nent of a healthy global financing system. However, institutional shortcomings make 
major private players’ risk exposure asymmetric. Large negative risks are only virtual 
ones: in reality, these players undertake one large positive risk due to the lack of inter-
national regulations on and formal procedures for sovereign crisis situations. And in 
some specific cases, investment protection agreements between an indebted country 
and the United States also cover the subject of sovereign debt and thereby protect 
the interest of major American investors, so their real risk exposure is more limited.
Based on the literature in the sovereign credit market, a specific group of investors 
started to purchase the debt of countries coping with debt difficulties at a discount 
price; these are often called vulture funds and rogue creditors. Many times, these 
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creditors do not agree with debt restructuring agreements, they try to stay out, and 
continue to demand the full amount from the debtors.
Sovereign default and its settlement mechanisms boil down to two basic questions 
by certain authors (Schadler, 2015):
1) Legal technical procedure for restructuring: What shall be the legal and proce-
dural framework of state debt restructuring when the debt of the country (with a sig-
nificant share of international creditors) surpasses the country’s debt servicing ability 
without serious disruptions of its economic and social order?
2) The responsibility of international assistance and creditors: In what situations 
shall the IMF or another international organisation provide financial assistance to a 
country in difficult situation and impose an obligation on bondholders to bear part 
of the loss?
It is apparent that the above components have been elaborated on in Keynes’s 
proposal, as part of a single system.
 
The definition of sovereign default  
and its current practice 
The commonly accepted definition of sovereign default is that a central government 
of a sovereign state does not fulfil its credit type obligations, or does not fulfil them ac-
cording to the original conditions, and causes damage to creditors. Sovereign default 
is generally followed by a shorter/longer process where the parties involved exchange 
their existing state debt instruments (bonds, credit, securities, etc.), in the framework 
of a legal procedure, to new debt instruments. This is called restructuring, which has 
two main elements:8
– Debt rescheduling: extending the maturity of the debt. This is a form of debt 
relief, as the instalments are smaller (and prolonged in time). 
– Debt reduction: the nominal value of the debt (the amount to be paid back) is 
reduced, which can be accompanied by reducing the burden of interest as well.
It is hard to make general comments on the direct causes of sovereign default; 
it is generally caused by several factors: excessive accumulation of debt, internation-
al lending cycles, sudden and significant decrease in the price of raw materials and 
crops, etc. The subject of creditor liability (there is no over-indebtedness without 
excessive lending) that had already been raised by Keynes was often highlighted by 
other prominent international financial experts as well (Sándor Lámfalussy, Joseph 
Stiglitz, for example). Market failure often happens in this area. And often there is 
non-negligible asymmetry (in strength, knowledge, information) between the so-
phisticated, large international providers of funds and the decision makers in the 
governments of developing countries. Market imperfections are exacerbated by bank 
capital controls that transfer financing risks (interest, exchange rate, maturity) to the 
debtors. As a consequence, a well-known phenomenon (the so-called “original sin”) 
happens: a financing shortage in the local currency, foreign creditors are willing to 
provide funds in an international currency only. In segments with lower credit rating, 
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the main characteristic of international financing market is high volatility. Even small-
er problems (emerging even in other regions or countries) trigger strong reactions 
to financing this circle of countries. Financing is totally independent of the financing 
needs of these debtors; what is more, it often happens that funds are pulled out when 
debtors need them the most (making the process very pro-cyclic). These problems 
all had appeared already in Keynes’s analysis, but have been discussed ever since in 
international finances.
In the case of a loan provided to a sovereign debtor, the outcome of legal en-
forcement in court is uncertain, and state’s assets would not, or would limitedly 
serve as an ultimate security for the repayment of the loans. It is important to 
show the possible costs of a sovereign default because these unwanted costs are 
responsible for the mechanism that allows for the existence of loans provided for 
sovereign states. A  possible future international regulation on sovereign default 
should definitely take into account that incentives to repay loans should remain 
powerful enough.
Enforceability of a state debt is highly increased when the debt is to other states 
(even with more international influence) or when these states, referring to an invest-
ment treaty, take actions to protect their private creditors. In many cases, it was the 
IMF itself that strongly represented the interests of international creditors against 
debtors. A very good example for this is the Argentine crisis in 2001, where the IMF 
deliberately prolonged negotiations, extending the agony of the country (Stiglitz, 
2007). Uncertain and long debt restructuring is the most important cost item in a 
sovereign bankruptcy. Finally, the Argentine government came to the decision that it 
is better for them to get out of the crisis on their own, without a new IMF programme, 
which then they accomplished successfully.
Another important cost item in sovereign default derives from reputation loss and 
its various economic consequences. One form of this is when private creditors, hav-
ing no general legal enforcement tools in their hands, apply exclusion from financial 
markets, meaning they do not give new loans after bankruptcy. At the same time, 
it is empirically proven that sovereign default does not imply the final exclusion of 
the country from international financial markets. On the contrary, the memory of 
the markets is generally not too long. Especially after a successful debt restructuring 
process, markets do not discriminate, so lending to the given country can resume 
surprisingly fast. Exclusion from financial markets may appear in a less severe form, 
through the increase of loan costs, but its effects last for a short time, not more than 
2 or 3 years (IMF, 2013).
Loss of reputation (confidence crisis) is manifest in the permanent deterioration 
of bilateral economic relations (between economic players of the creditor country 
and those of the debtor country), through the decline of working capital movement 
and trade. Freezing of foreign supplier credits is also an important channel to de-
teriorating trade relations. It must be noted that the breakdown of trade relations 
entail economic loss for both parties, so cannot be considered a lasting tool for sanc-
tioning.
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Last but not least, the negative impacts of sovereign defaults on the national econ-
omy and politics are also important to be highlighted. Effects on the domestic econ-
omy are most clearly manifest in the banking sector, especially when domestic banks 
provide significant funds to finance state debt — in these cases sovereign default can 
cause bank crisis. Sovereign default generally results in economic downturn, with una-
voidable political consequences. Thus, sovereign defaults often lead to the failure of 
leading government officials and a change of government. Therefore, decision-mak-
ers might well be encouraged to postpone national bankruptcy out of own interests, 
even when bankruptcy would be a rational step on the social level (see Vidovics-Dancs, 
2014). Let me note that it also implies compromising that leads to a situation where a 
completely weak country de facto loses its fiscal sovereignty.
Initiatives,  proposals
In this and next chapter, we will group and evaluate the various reform proposals and 
their criticisms. Initiatives and proposals on reforming sovereign bankruptcies can 
be divided into two groups: 1) specific technical instruments that by themselves can 
improve the practice of national bankruptcies; 2) comprehensive proposals on a new 
system of institutions. 
Specific prevention instruments
Experts attach particular importance to the so-called prevention instruments. 
– For reducing the pro-cyclical impacts of international financing, the general use 
of the so-called GDP bonds. The credit costs of these bonds would move in tandem 
with the rate of economic growth. The costs would be higher in case of a rapid eco-
nomic growth than in case of a declining economy.
– Another prevention instrument is tightening the rules for the transparency of 
national debts and Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA). There are several international 
forums for the risk assessment of countries. The most well-known ones are IMF’s DSAs. 
Also worth mentioning the OECD country reports that mainly reflect the (consensu-
al!) value judgment of country export credit agencies. With an increased involvement 
of these forums, the information barriers to the debt situation of a certain country 
would be lowered. Public fund providers of OECD countries are already bound by 
requirements for debt sustainability, i.e. they cannot provide new funds to a country 
whose debt was assessed as unsustainable by the IMF. However, these rules do not apply 
to private players. It could be made obligatory that players who do not take sustain-
ability signals into account should not receive any subsidies or international support.
– The strengthening of the framework of the so-called rules-based fiscal policies. 
A good example is the Constitution of Hungary, which includes debt rules also, so 
these rules are protected by a legal instrument of the highest level.9 The rules-based 
fiscal policies are regarded successful if they establish not only rules on procedures 
and transparency, but also institutional mechanisms for the enforcement of the rules. 
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– The reform of bilateral investment treaties can also strengthen prevention. Well 
in advance of debt problems, it would be appropriate to explicitly exclude the various 
forms of state debts from these treaties. In the current global liquidity glut, the nega-
tive market impact of these kinds of changes would be minimal.
Handling the “too little, too late” problem
Debt restructuring is a time-consuming process in which coordination between credi-
tors might get difficult, potentially leading to the “free-rider phenomenon”; and pri-
vate creditors liquidate their positions, and exposures and costs remain at public play-
ers and/or international institutions. 
Establishment of agreements between creditors could be made much faster and 
more efficient by the general introduction of the so-called Collective Action Clauses 
(CAC), which would make the agreement of the qualified majority of creditors suf-
ficient, and this agreement would be binding for the rest of the creditors also. Ac-
cording to a decision of the Eurogroup (an informal body of financial ministers in 
the euro area Member States), a CAC is required to be included in all new euro area 
government bonds issued after 1 January 2013.10 
The other element in the solution for the “too little, too late” problem would be a 
rule that hinders public players and international institutions from bailing out private 
players’ credits. This could be achieved by setting Private Sector Involvement (PSI) 
as a condition for public and international institutions to be involved in the solution 
of the debt crisis or, in other words, public intervention should not be made possible 
without a bail-in (recapitalisation by creditors or release of the debt).
Comprehensive instruments
As is shown above, following major international debt crises, initiatives on a compre-
hensive institutional review of debt restructuring gain ground. The global economic 
crisis in 2008 gave a new impetus for proposals for the overall framework of sovereign 
bankruptcy, endorsed by international organisation as well. Proposals can be divided 
into two main groups: solutions based on either legislation or on arbitration proceed-
ings. The supranational character, i.e. the limitation of national sovereignty, is more 
pronounced in the legislation-based approach.
Proposals based on legislation:
– IMF’s proposal on a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) in 
2002/2003, which was given another push in 2012/2013 by the organisation, although 
IMF published it again only as an expert material (so-called “staff paper”) (IMF, 
2013). The initiative was halted, mainly due to lack of support by the USA (Mooney, 
2015). The proposal assigns a significant role to the IMF in the management of debt 
crises: 1) providing interim financing; 2) analysing debt sustainability, leading nego-
tiations; 3) proposing a global solution, so sovereign defaults would be legally man-
aged through one forum (Dispute Resolution Forum, DRF), similarly to the proposal 
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on arbitration. The proposal includes the compulsory use of CACs and an obligation 
for the creditor to suspend debt enforcement during negotiations on restructuring. 
– In 2010, the sovereign crisis of the euro area led to the proposal on the European 
Crisis Resolution Mechanism (ECRM), outlined by the think-tank Bruegel, recom-
mending a set of rules binding across the whole of the EU (Gianviti et al., 2010). 
Thus, it is a supranational proposal that consists of three pillars: 1) a legal institution 
to resolve disputes; 2) an economic institution to analyse debt sustainability and lead 
negotiations; 3) a financial institution to provide interim financing.
The essence of both proposals is that the agreement of the qualified majority 
(more than 75%) of creditors (considering all types of instruments) represents a valid 
decision binding for all creditors. By contrast, the Collective Action Clause represents 
a decision binding for all within only one instrument. In the European Union, only 
the CAC was introduced, the Bruegel concept was not.
We show that as a result of the 2010 sovereign crisis, the EU laid emphasis on estab-
lishing the institutional background for the short-term financing of countries in debt 
crisis, rather than on genuine institutional reform of debt restructuring. Therefore, 
countries’ debt management remained within the already existing ad hoc framework, 
which is, as we will see, the reflection of international power relations. At the same 
time, as long as debt restructuring is underway, the interim financing of a given coun-
try is arranged from the then created funds (the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)), if the country is cooperative 
enough. So, instead of expiring private creditor debts, these institutions step in as 
fund providers. Their fundamental philosophy is based on so-called “cash-for-reform 
programmes”. In the framework of these programmes, they demand significant fiscal 
constraints and privatisation from crisis-stricken countries, further enhancing eco-
nomic decline and social tensions. Another important aspect of EFSF and ESM is 
that there is a weak democratic control over them and both of them are closely inter-
twined with the private sector.11 
Keynes’s situation analysis correctly describes the current international economic 
climate within the euro area. The above solution is clearly in the best interest of the 
“core” countries in the EU (to a large extent, Germany) that had a persistently posi-
tive foreign trade/current account balance. The previously mentioned crisis-stricken 
countries, most of them in the Mediterranean and some of them in the CEE region, 
were deficit economies in the years before 2008. The continuous deficit/surplus situ-
ations have built up a large group of debtors and creditors, and the whole system 
was financed by private financial institutions of core countries.12 Therefore, the crisis 
basically derived from a competitiveness problem: the catching-up process in the EU 
stalled. This is important because it lead to an inappropriate management of the 
crisis. European decision-makers demanded a significant fiscal adjustment from the 
countries in trouble, although the crisis-stricken Ireland and Spain had lower state 
debt and budget deficit than most of the countries in the euro area. Therefore, the 
whole process is morally questionable (e.g. Greeks being portrayed as lazy in the Eu-
ropean press) as, for example, the external trade surplus of Germany, and thus the 
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well-being of the Germans, was financed through de facto German loans by countries 
lagging behind (e.g. the Greeks). However, neither Germany, nor the EU has imple-
mented any meaningful programmes to improve the competitiveness of Greece. This 
paper is not to make a judgment on the efficiency of various regional development 
programmes in the EU; however, it is a fact that there was no substantial catch-up 
made in the last 10 years, which is aptly reflected by the change in the relative eco-
nomic development of periphery countries compared to Germany. The mean (un-
weighted) per capita GDP of the periphery countries involved in the study was 42% of 
the same value in Germany in 2007. This mean percentage decreased to 38% by 2016. 
Changes by countries are shown in the graph below.
Table 1:  Changes of GDP per capita expressed in EUR, in proportion to GDP per capita in 
Germany, between 2007 and 2016 (in percentage points)
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Figure 1: Balance on Goods and Services
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The Figure 1 clearly shows the expansion of the German export and that the pe-
riphery countries could only improve their external balance through significant in-
ternal constraints, as a result of which their economic catch-up was halted. From the 
perspective of the stability in the EU as a whole and the global economy, Germany 
was criticised for its current-account surplus, the issue was examined even by the Eu-
ropean Commission. Germany’s trade surplus already exceeds that of China on a sus-
tained basis. The Economist’s most recent article on the subject was published in 2017, 
in which the phenomenon was called as “The German problem”. The article says that 
Germany is a country that “saves too much and spends too little” and it is “bad for the 
world economy”. Germany’s consumer spending in proportion to GDP is persistently 
lower than in other big economies (USA, Great Britain, etc.) and the country’s invest-
ment rate is at a low level (The Economist, 2017).
As a result of the global debt crisis, the persistent deficit-surplus relationship made 
debtor-creditor relations tense.13 In this context, if policy makers of core countries 
had acknowledged that the demand of deficit countries had greatly contributed to 
their own countries’ previous growth, and in turn they had shown some solidarity 
during debt restructurings, then the costs of the latter would have suddenly appeared 
in their own financial system, slowing down their own domestic economic activity. It 
clearly proves that voluntary loss assumption by the creditor is highly unlikely without 
an institutionalised form of creditor contribution, proposed by Keynes.
Based on the above it can be stated that the ESFS and ESM are given a similar 
role to that of the IMF, concentrating their activities on the euro area, in the best 
interest of the influential “core” Member States of the EU. The PIIGS countries and 
Cyprus were financed from these funds at the time of debt crisis. This paper, however, 
is not intended to detail the activities of these funds, because, as mentioned above, 
they have been created mainly in the interests of private creditors to provide interim 
financing.14 Let us continue then with the other type of comprehensive reform pro-
posal.
Out of proposals for an arbitration based solution, let me highlight a concept embraced 
by NGOs called Fair and Transparent Arbitration Process (FTAP). Based on FTAP, the 
UNCTAD established a working group on Debt Workout Mechanism (DWM).15 This 
paper only mentions reform proposals from NGOs, but does not present them in 
detail. In our opinion, if a proposal, no matter how fair and efficient it may be, is not 
embraced by an international organisation and not integrated into any of their pro-
grammes, the chances for its implementation are practically zero.
The central elements of the “arbitration solution” are the establishment of an ap-
proved institution, conferred with decision-making powers (by both the debtor and 
its creditors) and, in the case of a country, the general use of the arbitration clause in 
all of the country’s agreements associated with any future debt (bank loans, sovereign 
debt, loans provided by international organisations and bonds). One form could be 
a court operated by the UN. An advantage to this, compared to the IMF proposal, is 
that while the IMF itself is an active lender, the UN could act more independently in 
solving these types of problems. This approach does not require any change in inter-
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national law. At the same time, it would serve as a replacement for the current debt 
settlement forums, the Paris and London Clubs.
In December 2014, the UN General Assembly established an ad hoc committee on 
sovereign debt restructuring, and the secretariat of the committee is provided by the 
UNCTAD.16 This committee does the expert work to reform sovereign debt restruc-
turing.17 Nevertheless, there is still no forum for practical debt settlement.
All in all, every reform proposal would establish new procedural processes that 
would make state bankruptcy management and power relations smoother and more 
balanced. However, neither of these comprehensive reform proposals has been im-
plemented.
 
Critical voices:  no need for reforms
Based on the arguments below, IMF experts (Rediker and Ubide, 2014) consider the 
current practice appropriate from many aspects. The most common criticisms of the 
reforms, also reflected in the above-mentioned IMF material, are as follows:
1) Contrary to the critical rhetoric, restructurings were generally smooth over 
the past decades. Based on the data from the cited experts, the average duration 
of credit restructurings (from bankruptcy until the finalisation of restructuring) was 
28 months.
In our opinion, an average of more than two years of uncertain financing can be 
considered significant, as in the meantime the economic players and the banking sys-
tem cannot attract more sources, causing considerable negative impacts on the real 
economy. The IMF named two major debt crises (in Argentina and Greece) as outli-
ers in sovereign debt restructuring, and removed them from the study sample. This 
rather questionable methodology resulted in a highly controversial distortion, as the 
two countries removed were the ones that underperformed the most, and not even 
pretence of impartiality could be maintained (see above the criticism on how the IMF 
handled the Argentine crisis).
2) IMF should draw more attention to risks rather than to reform proposals. IMF 
should name problematic countries and their financial risks in its various reports. It 
should exercise wider control over the development of country risks, and should not 
only deal with indebtedness of individual countries but also with cross-border finan-
cial processes, the unhedged currency position of the corporate sector, and various 
types of debts. 
This argument is a bogus solution. In general, crises are hard to predict, and the 
reports of national banks and international organisations are not effective in holding 
back market processes. It is greatly demonstrated, for example, by the fact that cen-
tral banks’ financial stability reports had very weak forecasting power in terms of the 
2007/2008 crisis (Davies and Green, 2010). Experience shows that such reports have 
a very limited moral impact on market players.18
3) For critics, the most painful solution is an initiative saying that in certain cases 
the condition of entry for the EU/IMF should be that private creditors take part of 
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the loss (bail-in). Critics say that this step would increase credit risks, which would 
require more IMF intervention in the future, and would definitely increase financing 
costs.
Our opinion about this piece of criticism is that in case this condition is ex ante at-
tached to new credits in the future, the risk premium could be balanced by the impact 
made by creditors becoming more careful and undertaking lower financing risks only. 
The “search for yields” bandwagon effect could be more moderate and probably less 
likely turn into credit crises. One of the most important lessons learnt from recurring 
sovereign debt crises is that in the future a significantly lower level of indebtedness of 
a developing country would be desirable.
The examples of Greece,  Hungary and Ukraine
In 2010, prior to the first debt restructuring, the Greek government owed EUR 310 bil-
lion to its private creditors, mainly “prudent” European banks and other financial me-
diators (big insurance companies, investment funds). In the first two debt restructur-
ing processes, the troika (the European Commission representing the EU, the ECB 
and the IMF) provided EUR 250 billion to the Greek government; the largest part 
was undertaken by the EU and the ECB. However, Greece had to spend 92% of this 
amount to bail out private creditors and to finance its own domestic financial system 
(largely consisting of subsidiaries of European institutions), and only the remaining 
8% could be spent freely by the Greek government. By 2012 it became clear that 
the Greek crisis cannot be solved without some degree of debt relief. Therefore, an 
agreement was made about the 50% write-off of the still existing Greek debt to private 
creditors, which proved to be insufficient for the following reasons: 1) by this time 
most of the foreign private creditors were bailed out by the funds of the troika; 2) the 
agreement affected the Greek national financial institutions primarily, so they went 
bankrupt, and Greece had to take out new loans to recapitalise them; 3) the already 
mentioned vulture investment funds refused to sign the agreement purchased debt 
instruments worth EUR 6.5 billion and took legal action to enforce their claim. Later 
on these funds compelled the Greek government to sign a special agreement, bring-
ing substantial profits for them (Kamenis, 2014).
Despite the above-specified measures, the Greek debt still stood at EUR 317 billion 
in 2014, 78% of it owed to the troika, so from Community sources (from taxpayers’ 
money). Due to the sharp decline in GDP, the debt-to-GDP ratio considerably in-
creased. Therefore, the troika did not manage to solve the Greek debt problem, only 
to bail out its European private creditors (Jones, 2015).
As a result of the crisis, real GDP in Greece fell by 23% from 2008 to 2013. The 
unemployment rate was as high as 27.5% in 2013. As was presented above, the first 
two rescue packages did not bring a solution to the financing problem in Greece, the 
country’s relative debt stock further increased substantially. The radical left-wing party 
Syriza, led by Alexis Tsipras, referred to the 1953 debt restructuring in Germany as 
the model for restructuring the Greek debt. The 1953 London Conference decided 
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on writing off half of all external debt of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger-
many), and the repayment of the other half was made subject to the export income 
producing ability of West Germany. The London Agreement, which greatly contrib-
uted to rebuilding the German economy, was signed, inter alia, by Greece as well 
(Jones, 2015). There is no need to emphasise the geopolitical role of West Germany 
in the middle of the cold war.
By early 2015, it became obvious that, despite the required austerity policy, Greece 
cannot fulfil its debt service obligations without a more substantial debt relief. How-
ever, the troika demanded stringent austerity measures from the Greek government 
in exchange for maintaining financing. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras had to make a 
choice: 1) either accepts the conditions of the troika, and goes against the main point 
of his political programme; or 2) goes bankrupt and handles the ensuing economic 
and social chaos. At this point he put the question to referendum in which 61% of 
the Greeks said “no” to creditors’ conditions. At the same time, more than 70% sup-
ported the euro. The outcome of the referendum did not influence the demands of 
the troika; the democratically expressed desire of the Greek people was ignored com-
pletely. After the referendum, Tsipras signed the third rescue package (new financing, 
with no debt relief) that included further constraints (lower pensions, higher taxes) 
and structural changes (labour market, privatisation) for the next three years. Signifi-
cant internal tensions, a government crisis and early elections followed. In short, as 
a country lacking a prominent geopolitical role and having weak abilities to protect 
its own interests, Greece (with the sword of Grexit above its head19) was beaten by 
core countries’ ability to assert their own interests. We cannot speak about European 
solidarity at all. Let me note that the idea behind the troika’s firm steps was that any al-
lowance given to Greece would have constituted a precedent for other (larger) Medi-
terranean countries in debt (Spain, Italy). The third rescue programme for Greece 
will be completed in the middle of 2018, but it is not expected to be the last one, as 
public debt in Greece is at a level of 180% compared to the GDP, so still considered 
to be unsustainable.
Hungary was the leader in the Central and Eastern European region in the catch-
ing-up process at the millennium. However, due to the change in the economic policy 
in 2002, fiscal policy has focused on short-term growth goals through stimulating con-
sumption, which was accompanied by the rapid deterioration of economic balance 
and longer-term growth prospects. The growing consumption of the state and the 
private sector was largely covered by external funding. All the different economic 
players (central government, local governments, companies, households20) raised a 
large amount of foreign exchange-based debt, a significant part of which was denomi-
nated in Swiss francs. By the time of the 2008 crisis, Hungary has become the most 
vulnerable economy in the region. Hungary was the second country (after Iceland) 
to receive financial assistance from the European Commission and the International 
Monetary Fund, totalling in some EUR 14.3 billion loans in the course of 2009 and 
2010. The borrowing requirement was a fiscal adjustment, which was unsuccessful due 
to its strong procyclical impact (relative debt indicators deteriorated).21
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In 2010, the newly elected government made sharp changes in the economic pol-
icy. Consolidation of the state budget with minimal damage to the real economy has 
become the primary aim. Another goal was to reduce the external vulnerability of 
the economy. Until early 2013, the Hungarian government maintained negotiations, 
with several interruptions, with the IMF and the Commission for further financing, 
but no new lending was made. On one hand, the IMF and the Commission wanted to 
force the Hungarian government for conditions (e.g. the withdrawal of the bank tax 
introduced22) that it would not take, on the other the most difficult part of the financ-
ing crisis was resolved by 2013 due to the successful economic policy mix introduced 
between 2010 and 2013.23 Finally, Hungary got out of the crisis on their own, without 
a new IMF programme like Argentina in 2002.
The Ukrainian crisis erupted in 2013. In February 2014, a bit more than one week 
before the IMF-EU rescue package, in the middle of the Ukrainian political and eco-
nomic crisis (Kiev was in turmoil), the American vulture fund, the Franklin Temple-
ton Investment Funds24, specialised for debt crises, purchased sovereign bonds worth 
USD 1 billion from Russia, and thus became the owner of more than one third of 
Ukraine’s foreign USD bonds. At that time, the above-mentioned investment fund 
possessed a non-negligible stock of Hungarian FX bonds, had built up its positions in 
the early 2010s: held 12% of the Hungarian public debt in its hands.
Let me note that the Bilateral Investment Protection Treaty between the Ukraine 
and the United States covers sovereign debts as well (Woods and John, 2014), protect-
ing the interests of Templeton and similar large investors who are thus exposed to 
lower levels of risks.
Under the leadership of the IMF, Ukraine received its first financial aid package of 
USD 17.5 billion from international organisations in 2015. Following this, Ukraine’s 
private creditors (except for the Russian ones) made an agreement on restructuring 
(20% decrease in the face value of bonds, the rate of bond coupons was set at 7.75%, 
and interest and capital payment was frozen for four years) (Reuters, 2015). The 
rate of the bond haircut was lower than market expectations, so the bonds’ value was 
appreciated and their market value did not decrease, in spite of the haircut. Some 
experts say that Ukraine’s geopolitical position and the structure of its creditors 
played a significant role in that the crisis management was relatively fast and efficient. 
Can real progress be expected?
In view of the Keynes-White dispute, presented above, the global economic policy 
thinking is still clearly determined by White’s views in today’s world. In the global 
monetary system, debt restructuring solutions are subordinated to the global eco-
nomic order, and not to national economy policies, as shown by the recent examples 
of Greece, Hungary and Ukraine. According to this thinking, basically the debtor is 
held liable for imbalance and over-indebtedness. Obviously, the system cannot solve 
balance of payments problems between countries and the ensuing debt crises. The 
free movement of goods and capital is given an absolute priority. Although the exam-
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ple of China proves that a long-lasting economic catch-up can also be achieved while 
having significant constraints on capital movement at the same time. Based on our 
study, we conclude that out of the elements of the Keynesian system, only the intro-
duction of creditor’s liability as an instrument and the establishment of some sort of 
a supranational debt restructuring forum were proposed after the 2008 crisis, besides 
some small-scale technical suggestions (e.g. the CAC). The reform proposals have not 
brought about any significant change in the management of sovereign debt defaults.
We have shown that after the 2010 sovereign crisis in the euro area, the emphasis 
was laid on establishing the institutional background for the short-term financing of 
countries in debt crisis, rather than on genuine institutional reform of debt settle-
ment. The then created institutions (the EFSF, and later the ESM) almost entirely lack 
democratic control, and their practices prove so far that they protect the interests of 
the “core” countries and their private creditors. And even in the worst of the crisis, 
the indebted countries are asked to implement more fiscal constraints and privatisa-
tion programmes as a prerequisite for further financing.
In our opinion, the institutional system of sovereign debt crisis management can 
only be reformed by massive support of already existing international organisations. 
Individual reform ideas, no matter how good they are, have no real chances for 
implementation if they lack support. A big step forward would be if IMF/EU aban-
doned their practice of protecting private investors and provided better safeguards 
for indebted countries and/or their own taxpayers. To this end, IMF should turn 
back to its Keynesian roots, the traces of which can still be found in the IMF’s found-
ing treaty.
Large international banks and investors and their home countries (the core coun-
tries) have no interest in institutional reforms. It is more beneficial for them if sov-
ereign default remains a slow process with uncertain outcomes and even enormous 
costs. What is important for these actors is that there would be no real international 
solidarity and creditor liability, meaning that private sector involvement in debt re-
structuring (bail-in, haircut) would not be a general practice.
Notes
1  The author owes a debt of thanks to András Póra for his valuable advice.
2  See, for example, Taleb, 2012, who says that the world is characterised by major risks and limited 
forecastability. Out of the economic reasons for social vulnerability, he highlights over-specialisation, 
pointing out that although David Ricardo might be right in that efficiency is increased when every 
country pursues activities in which they have comparative advantage, but it also entails that the 
vulnerability of the national economy in question is highly increased. According to Taleb, the main 
deficiency of the Ricardian Theory, which still serves today as the basis of trade liberalisation and, thus, 
the global order, is that it does not take account of the swift and dramatic changes of market conditions; 
however, a society and a national economy should be prepared for these low-probability but high-impact 
events.
3  ECB’s Financial Stability Review (ECB, 2017) also calls attention to this fact. The tightening of 
international monetary conditions, especially if it is accompanied by the strengthening of the dollar, 
can put emerging economies with internal and external imbalances into a difficult situation.
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4  Of course, several elements of the system have changed (exchange rate mechanisms, the impact of the 
Chinese monetary policy, the euro area, international stability and investment institutions of the EU/
Asia, etc.); however, we regard the current international monetary order as the continuation of the 
Bretton Woods system due to its influential institutions and the dominance of the dollar in it.
5  See https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.
6  See, for example, Article I: “The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are… to facilitate the 
expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and 
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive 
resources of all members as primary objectives of economy policy.”
7  See, for example, one of the first such proposals, made as a response to the 1981 crisis, to set up a formal 
legal framework: Oechsli, 1981.
8  For a detailed classification of sovereign bankruptcies, see the article of Vidovics-Dancs, 2014.
9  For details, see the article of Kolozsi et al., 2017, which describes the causal link between the provisions 
on public finances in the Constitution of Hungary and economic policy events after 2010.
10  See https://europa.eu/efc/collective-action-clauses-euro-area_en. As most of the Greek debt was 
issued according to national law, the Greek Parliament, supported by the troika, passed a law on the 
retrospective use of the above-mentioned clause, so the clause was attached to all debts issued according 
to the local law, which made it easier for the troika to replace private creditors.
11  For example, EFSF and ESM cannot be obliged to make public any documents related to their operation. 
During the 2010 sovereign crisis, the troika (ECB, Commission, IMF) and, supposedly, the ESM as well 
had the restructuring programmes and the necessary financial audits devised by large international 
consultant firms (e.g. Oliver Wyman, BlackRock, Roland Berger, Pimco), giving them substantial 
business advantage, see CEO, 2014.
12  Before 2008, private financial institutions of the core countries effectively channelled savings towards 
Mediterranean and CEE  countries, indirectly financing their national, municipality, corporate and 
retail credit debts.
13  On this issue see, for example, Galgóczi, 2013.
14  For the historical background of the two instruments, see https://www.esm.europa.eu/about-us/history.
15  See http://www.unctad.info/en/Debt-Portal/News-Archive/Our-News/Debt-Workout-Mechanism-First-
Working-Group-meeting--Toward-an-Incremental-Approach-2072013-/.
16  A/RES/69/247 Modalities for the implementation of resolution 68/304, entitled “Towards the 
establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes”.
17  http://unctad.org/en/Pages/GDS/Sovereign-Debt-Portal/Sovereign-Debt-Portal.aspx.
18  A good example for the weak influence of national banks’ reports on the market is foreign currency 
lending in Hungary. The 2004 MNB stability report already indicated the problem, and in 2005 a special 
study on the subject was published by MNB. However, the real upswing in foreign lending in Hungary 
started only following this (Bethlendi et al., 2005).
19  Another debate is going on about to what extent could have Greece’s coerced exit from the euro area 
and from the EU (the Grexit) been feasible on procedural grounds and in economic terms. 
20  The issue of retail foreign currency debt see e.g. Bethlendi, 2011.
21  See for details of the above mentioned continuous downgraded process at: Matolcsy, 2008; Baksay and 
Palotai, 2017.
22  The Hungarian financial system was owned predominantly foreign, primarily Western European 
financial groups. The significant sectoral tax introduced resulted in serious conflicts of interest.
23  The most important elements of the successful economic policy mix were the following: 1) Introduction 
of specific sectoral taxes (mainly in finance), which has a rapid fiscal balancing effect. 2) Already in the 
short term, a significant budgetary impact was made by the abolishment of the second pillar (the man-
datory private pension) of the pension system. In 1998 the pay-as-you-go system was partially replaced 
by the mandatory private pension, therefore a part of the current contributions was payed to the private 
pension funds instead of the pay-as-you-go system. The resulting deficit of the pay-as-you-go system had 
to be financed by the budget, which kept the budget under pressure. Members of private pension funds 
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were reverted to the state system, so this current deficit disappeared, and the assets of the funds were 
also transferred to the state (nearly EUR 9 billion in value) improving the state’s financial balance. 3) 
Strengthening the tools for whitening the economy (connecting retailers’ cash registers to the tax au-
thority online, tightening tax inspections, etc.), which raised the revenue of the budget without raising 
taxes. 4) Reducing work-related taxes, introducing labour market reforms and public employment: the 
government tried to build up the base of economic growth by maintaining and gradually increasing 
the level of employment. 5) At the same time, a spending reduction programme has been announced 
(basically affecting the public sector, some social costs and education). 6) Local government debts were 
consolidated by the state and the phasing out of household foreign currency loans has begun. 7) The 
financing role of EU funds has been strengthened.
24  Templeton is not the only one adventurous investor. Less known ones who implement similar investment 
strategies are: Greylock Capital, Carlyle Group, LNG Capital, etc.
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